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INTEREST ON CLAIMS IN RECEIVERSHIP
PROCEEDINGS:!'
INTEIU:ST ON UNSECUIU:D CLAIMS

the cases of receivership, the Supreme Court of the
OUTSIDE
United States has said:
"We reach the conclusion that whatever may have been
the English and early American rule, the tendency in Virginia as elsewhere in this country, is to allow interest on contracts to pay money from the date that the debt becomes
due."1
Interest is allowed as a matter of law in cases of contract or the
unlawful detention of money.2 In the absence of statute the general rule is that in actions for .tort the allowarice of interest is not
an absolute right3-it rests in the discretion of the court or jury.'
The rule generally announced governing the payment of. interest
on claims in receivership proceedings may be briefly stated as
follows:-5
"As a general rule, after property of an insolvent passes
into the hands of a receiver, interest is not allowed on claims
against the funds. * * * The delay in distribution is the act
of the law; it is a necessary incident to the settlement of the
estate."

This rule was laid down early in the history of receiverships, has
been generally followed by courts ·of equity, and the substance of
this rule has been incorporated in the bankruptcy statutes of Eng*By Ralph E. Clark, of the Cincinnati Bar, author of Cl.ARK ON~.
Am. Iron Co. v. Seaboard Air Line (1913), 233 U. S. 261 at 26,5.
'Lincoln v. Claflin (1868), 7 Wall. 132 at 139·
'Drumm-Flato Commission Co. v. Edmisson (1907), 208 U.S. 534 at 539·
'The Scotland (1885), n8 U. S. 507 at 518; Lincoln v. Claflin (1868),
7 Wall. 132 at 139; Bates v. Dresser, March l, 1920, U. S. Supreme Court.
•Thomas v. Western Car Co. (1893), 149 U.S. 95at n6; New York Trust
Co. v. Detroit T. & I. Ry. (1918), 151 Fed. 514 at 519.
1
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land and the United States. Various reasons have been given for
the above rule. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors has said :6
"No debt can arise against an insolvent estate in the hands
of a receiver. From this principal comes the general rule
that only claims as then existing can be recognized as obligations of the estate. For this reason interest cannot be allowed
on claims after insolvency has been judicially declared."
Judge William H. Taft, then of the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Sixth District, in the case of Chemical National Bank v. Armstrong,
16 U. S., App. 465, at page 535, says:
"It will not do to say that the date fixed for stopping interest on all claims is a mere matter of convenience in calculating which works no injury to anyone because all are treated
alike. The creditor with a debt bearing 8% interest is very
injuriously affected in comparison with the creditor whose
debt bears but 4%.''
Lindley, L. J., in the case of In re Browne & Wingrove [1891],
L. R 2 Q. B. D., 574 at 5$1, says:
"The rule which prevents proof for future interest is not
a positive enactment-it is rather a rule of conv~ience. In
ordinary cases it produces no injustice.''
Mr. Justice Lamar in American Iron 'Co. v. Seaboard Air Line
(1913) 233 U.S. 261 at 266 said:
"And it is true as held in Tredegar Co. v. Seaboard Railway, 183 Fed. Rep. 289, 290. That as a general rule, after
property of an insolvent is in custodia legis, interest thereafter
accruing is not allowed on debts payable out of the funds
realized by sale of the property. But that is not because the
claims had lost their interest bearing qualities during that
period, but is a necessary and enforced rule of distribution,
due to the fact that in case of receiverships the assets are
generally insufficient to pay all debts in full. If all claims
were of equal dignity and all bore the same rate of interest
'Lippitt v. Thomas L. & T. Co. (1914), 88 Conn. 185 at 2o6, 90 Atl. 369.
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from the date of the receivership to the date of fi_nal distribution, it would ·be immaterial whether the dividend was calculated on the basis of the principal alone, or of interest and
principal combined. But some of the debts might carry a
high rate and some a low rate, and hence, inequality would
res~t in the payment of interest· which accrued during the
delay incident to collecting and distributing the funds. As
this delay was the act of the law, no one should thereby gain
an advantage or suffer a loss. For that and like reasons, in
case funds are not sufficient to pay claims of equal dignity,
the distribution is made only on the basis of the principal
debt. But that rule did not prevent the running of interest
during receivership; and if, as a result of good fortune or
good management, the estate proved sufficient to discharge
the claims in full, interest as well as principal should be paid."
It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile all these different
statements made by courts of high authority. We agree with the
statements made by Lindley, L. J., and Mr. Justice Lamar, just
quoted. When a t'eceiver is appointed of the property of an insolvent, be he an individual or corpoi::ation-liens, charges and equities
which existed ·before receivership are not chan{?:ed, altered or annulled by reason of the receivership. Furthermore, if a claimant
has a substantive right or claim against the individual or corporation
before insolvency, this ~ubstantive right is not cancelled or annulled
or divested by the receivership. A court of equity cannot change
the contracts and substantive rights of a claimant which existed before receivership. If this is true; then it is difficult to conceive how
a claimant's substantive right to interest against the insolvent individual or corporation cari ·be annulled or arrested at the time of
appointment of receiver. When the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Error says : "That no debt can arise against an insolvent estate in
the hands of a receiver," we believe this court nas not stated tne Iaw
correctly, if this court means that no obligation to pay"interest which
existed before receivership continues after appointment of receiver_
It is true that after appointment of a receiver, no obligation can be
initiated or created anew by the party whose property is in the hands
of a receiver so as to bind such property. But it certainly cannot

;8

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

be true that an obligation to pay interest ceases to be an obligation
by the appointment of a receiver. The New York court in the case
of Fera v. Wickham (18g2) 1 says: "By an assignment in trust for
the assignor's creditors, what natural equities previously existed become suspended by an intervention by the rights of· other creditors."
Such a statement·we believe, is in violation of the fundamental principles of equity, and is nof in accord with the most recent rulings of
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the southern district of New York, 8
nor with the most recent rulings of the Supreme Court of the United
States.11 We believe the rule stopping interest at time of appointment of receiver is a rule of convenience, and in most cases does
work for an equitable distribution to creditors, but not in all cases.
When a court of equity appoints a receiver of the property of an
insolvent person or corporation for the purpose of distributing this
property to creditors, the court appointing the receiver has deprived
claimants of their ordinary legal and equitable remedies against this
property. No levy, execution or attachment can be brought against
the assets of the insolvent when they are in the hands of a receiver.
The court of equity having deprived claimants of their ordinary
remedies invites such claiJ;nants to submit such claims to a receiver
or to a master for allowance and liquidation, or rejection, making
proper provisions for the receiver's or master's findings to be reported to the court for confirmation. It is the court's duty to dis-:tribute the assets equitably and ratably to claimants whose claims are
properly presented and proved. The appointment of a receiver cannot deprive a debt of its interest-bearing quality; neither can it .
annul'the contract of the insolvent to pay interest. If there is enough
property to go around, justice and the contractual rights of the
claimants demand that interest should be carried down to the actual
payment of the money.10 Therefore, to divide the property up equitT 135 N. Y. 223. See also People v. Am. Loan & T. Co. (1902), 172 N. Y
371 at 378, when Vann, J., says: "'By law the creditor becomes the equitable
owner of the assets and the administration of affairs is for their benefit
as such."
'Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co. (1912), 198 N. Y. 721 at 742.
•wm. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed (1917), 245 U. S. 597.
flLord Mansfield in Robinson v. Bland (176<>), 2 Burr. lo87; Blair v.
Clayton Ent. Co. (1910), 9 Del. Ch. 98; Williams, Adm. v. Am. Bank (1842),
4 Mete. 317 at 317.

'
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ably and ratably if sufficient to go around, interest must be figured
up to the time of distribution.11 If there is not sufficient property
to go around, which is of course the case when insolvency takes
place, then the only equitable and ratable distribution of the assets
appears to us to be to figure interest according to contracts on claims
up to the time of distribution, then declare such a· dividend as is possible on the amount of the claims, including interest.12 However, if
all claims bear the same rate of interest, we can of course stop
interest at time of appointment .of receiver or any other subsequent
time, and the division would be equitable and ratable; but if one
creditor has a debt bearing 8% interest, the stopping of interest at
time of appointment of receiver may very injuriously affect him in
comparison to the creditor whose debt bears but 4%.
Although authorities without number may be found for stopping
interest at time of appointment of receiver, nevertheless if it is
necessary to calculate interest on all claims up to the time of distribution in order to make a truly equitable and ratable distribution,
then we believe this ought and can be done without violating any
positive usage and rule of equity.
·
INTSRF:S't ON

sscuro:o

CLAIMS

A debtor when incurring his obligation to pay and giving security
for· such obligation, generally but not 'always by contract, secures
the payment ot interest as well as the prindpal of the debt. ·If he
does so secure the payment of interest, the creditor who has a right
· to hold or appropriate the security or collateral can hold or appropriate it when default occurs of either interest or principal. If interest
is so secured, then the creditor can not be compelled to relinquish his
right to hold or appropriate the security until he has been paid both
principal and all interest due up to the time he relinquished the security. If the security is realized and he is not paid his debt in full. then
:u. Cases of solvency. People v. Merchant's Trust Co. (1907), 187 N. Y.
29J, 79 N. E. 1004; First Nat. Bank v. J. I. Campbell Co. (1go8), 52 Tex.
Civ. App. 445, II4 S. W. 887. See Annotation I,. R. A. 1917 D., p. n66.
12
B1air v. Clayton Ent. Co. (1910), 9 Del. Ch. 95 at g8; Re Murray, Assignee of Commercial Ins. Co. (1836), 6 Paige 204; Amer. Iron Co.· v. Seaboard Air Line (1913), 233 U.S. 261 at 266.
·
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bis actual claim against the debtor insolvent is the original claim and
all interest up to date of presenting ms clai•, less the actual amount
realized by his security. In other words, out of the security or securities if they are more than enough to pay the secured creditor, he
must be paid his full claim with interest to date of payment before
any balance can be turned over to the receiver. for distribution to
other creditors.13 If interest on the creditor's claim is not subject to
lien, then the question arises, .shall interest be calculated on the
~editor's secured claim w~en the collateral or security is realized
and proceeds applied toward payment of the secured creditors
claim? If the creditor has no such lien covering his interest, then
he can not receive from the realization of his collaterals a sum
greater than his original debt, less interest. However, after he has
realized his securities, he still has a claim against the insolvent for
the balance of his original debt and for interest on it, whether this
be calculated to date of insolvency or to date of presentation of claim.
Now we come to the question on what basis shall the claim of the
secured creditor against the general assets be allowed? The so-called
Bankruptcy Rule forces the secured creditor to realize his securities
first and prove for the balance. On this balance he is to receive his
dividends. The so-called Chancery Rule allows the secured creditor
to receive dividends upon the original claim unreduced provided
that he shall not in the aggregate receive more than the total amount
of his debt or claim.
We believe the Chancery Rule in insolvency and Receivership
cases can not be upheld on equitable principles, although high authority ~ be cited for upholding it.14 Under the Chancery Rule
and under the rule refusing to calculate interest subsequent to appointment of receiver a secured claimant would present his claim
against the general assets for the original amount with interest up
to the time of insolvency anq appointment of receiver. Under the
u Spring Coat Co. v. Keech (1goz), 239 Fed. 48. 1917 L. R. A. II52 and
notes; Huff v. Bidwell (1914), 218 Fed. 6 at 9; F°U"st Nat. Bank v. Ewing,
103 Fed. 168. ·
sau. S. cases supporting Chancery Rule are Chemical Nat. Bk. v. Armstrong, 16 U. S. App. 465. 59 Fed. 372- 8 C. C. A. 155, 28 L R. A. 231, 6s
Fed. Si'3. 13 C. C. A. 4;r; Merrill v. Nat. Bank of Jacksonville (1898), 173
. U. S. 131. See howe-nr Westinghouse Etec. & Mfg. Co. v. Idaho Ry. L. & P.
Co. (1915), aa8 Fed. g;a.
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Bankruptcy Rule he would present his claim for the balance due
.after realization of his collateral with interest up to the time of appointment of receiver.
Our idea of a true equitable and ratable distribution along what
may be called scientific lines, would we believe, be to calculate the
original claim with interest agreed upon. up to the time of making
distribution, subtract from this the amount .realized from securities
or collateral realized, and pay dividends upon the balance.
INTt~T

ON PRIORITY CI.AIMS

W}len it has been determined that interest shall be allowed on
ordinary claims secured by mortgage, pledge, etc., the next question
which naturally presents itself ~s, shall interest -be allowed on claims
which by statute or otherwise have precedence or priority over such
secured claims? An ordinary lien is created by a contract between
the parties. If that lien cont~ct covers interest on the obligations
secured, then· interest must be ·added to the claim; if that contract
does not include interest, then any claim for interest must be met
out of general assets. Suppose however, the law either statutory or
otherwi~e, says that public policy demands and law or equity recognizes that ·certain claims when insolvency takes place shall be given
priority even over ordinary secured claims. Take for instance claims
for supplies secured by a lien which by statute takes priority over
mortgages. Does such a statute giving priority to certain claims,
cover interest on such claims? Of course, it is impossible to lay
down a rule covering all statutes when· each separate statute may be
worded di:fferently from every other statute. In the first place, the
appointment of a receiver has not created any claims, neither has it
added to nor taken away from any claims. If a claim before receivership drew interest, its interest :))earing quality has not been
taken away from it by appointment of a receiver. On the other
hand," if a claim did not bear interest, the appointment of a receiver
will not of itself make it interest-bearing.
As to interest on claims secured by a lien which is given priority
and which undoubtedly come within the case of American Iron Co.
v. Seaboard Air Line, there seems to be little doubt. As to cases
whe~ein the~e is no lien but only a priority declared by statute or by

42
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the six months priority rule or by other usages and rules of equity,
these cases present more difficulties.
We have two very important Federal Appellate Court cases15
wherein interest was allowed on claims for supplies which were preferred by the so-called six months' rule. In each of these cases there
were enough funds to pay such supply claimants in full with interest, without encroaching on the mortgage se~urity.
.
A case presents much greater difficulties wherein the holders of
priority claims ask interest on the same, subsequent. to time of appointment of a receiver, and if such interest is paid it must be taken
· out of the corpus of the estate and so reduce the amount .payable to
th~ mortgage creditors. This situatio~ is fully discussed in the case
of New York T. Co. v. Detroit T. & I. Ry. Co. (1918) 251 Fed. 514.
The court in that case concedes that in his circuit the rule prevails
that six months' claims are payable out of the earnings of the receivership, or even in a proper case, from the corpus of the company's property in preference to the mortgag~s foreclosed. The
court concedes that the case before him (mainly supplies of railroad
ties) comes under the .six months' rule, and in refusing interest cites
as authority the case of Thomas v. Western Catt Co., 149 U. S. n6.
The court, however, overlooks we believe, the fact that Mr. Justice
Shiras in the Thomas case specifically makes the statement that the
claim for car rentals 'did not come under supplies furnished from
day to day and necessary for the maintenance of the road. Furthermore,_ the claim for interest in the Thomas case was attempted to be
inflicted on the mortgagors as a penalty for resisting claims. This
was refused. Since in the Thomas case the court refused to allow
the car claims as six months priority claims at all, it is very difficult
to apply what the court said concerning interest on those claims to a
case like the N. Y. Trwt Co. case where the court actually concedes
that the claims themselves come under the six months rule.
Says Mr. Justice Lamar in Am. Iron Co. v. Seaboard Air Line
when commenting on the Thomas case:
"For manifestly, the law does not contemplate that either
the debtor or the trustees can, by securing the appointment
""Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co. (1914), 216 Fed. 458 at 471;
Texas Co. v. International & G. N. Ry. Co. (1918), 250 Fed. 742 at 14s.
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of Receiver, stop the running of interest on claims of the
highest dignity.''
This is true whether the mortgage claims are not paid. at all or
,are paid in :Part or in full. The only justification of stopping payment of interest on claims at time of appointment, is because in
cases of a deficiency of assets the cutting off of interest at time of
appointment amounts to the same thing as adding it to claims of
equal dignity and then in the distribution scaling these claims down
below the original claims plus this interest added. In other words,
as between claims of equal dignity and equal interest ·hearing qualityit does not help to add a ce~ per cent and then have to take it off
again for lack of funds. But this rule of interest does not apply as
between claims of different dignities, because it does not work an
equitable and ratable distribution. For instance, if $I,ooo and interest is due on first mortgage claims, and $1,000 and interest is due_
on second mortgage claims, all other things being equal and we cut
off the interest on ~e first mortgage_ claims, we are actually depriving the first mortgage holders of what they are entitled to by contract of mortgage. If the contract of mortgage says so, this interest
is covered by the pledge, and the court can not cut it out in favor of
the second mortgagee·. Does it make any difference if the priority
claimant bases his claim on a statute or usage and rule of equity
rather than on a contract lien? Judge Sater in the N. Y. Trust Co.
case, concedes that the six months claims have priority over the
mortgage claims, but refuses to allow interest on the six months
<:laims beyond the time of appointment of receiver. If Judge Sater's
proposition is sound, which gives the six-months claims priority over
mortgages, then we are unable to see why interest on these claims
should not he given priority over the mortgages. If the supply
claimants have their money used and tied up to keep up the mortgage security, they it would seem should be entitled to interest on
the sapie, as well as· the mortgage security holders themselves are
entitled to interest. If the policy of the law says that supply claimants ~re and have added their property to the mortgagee's security,
and the security covers interest on the mortgage debt, then the supply
creditor has added his property and lost the earning power of. that
property in order that the mortgage creditor may recover his debt

44
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and also interest on same. We can not from the facts of the case oi
N. Y. v. Detroit, distinguish it on principle from Am. Iron Co. v.
Seaboard Air Line; Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co_. and Texas
Co. v. International G. N. Ry. Co., unless there were !aches or some·
thing of the kind which was not brought out in the report of th<:. case.
We are aware of a number of decisions holding as does Judge
Sater, but we bel~ve these. decisions must give way to the principles
as stated above and laid doWn in Am. Iron Co. v. Seaboard Air Line.
A discretion as to allowing interest is allowed on matters of tort,
Eddy v. Lafayette, 163 U. S. 456 at 467; De La Rama v. De La
Rama (1915) 241 U.S. 154, at 159· However, in cases of contract
or the unlawful detention of money interest is allowed as a matter
of law. Lincoln v. Claflin (1868) 7 Wall., 132 at 139· If courts
will, as a matter of law, allow interest on contract cl~ims and on the
unlawful detention of money, does not a claim for payment of supplies come under one or the other? If as a matter of law interest
is recoverable on such a claim, it becomes part of the claim, and if
this is so how can we separate the two and when the time of payment comes allow the original claim to be preferred ana not allow
interest on.the same to ·be.preferred.
·
lNT£nsT ON JUDGM£NTS nND£RlU> SUBSF:Qt7£NT To nc£MRSHIP

Outside of the law of receivers, a judgment will ordinarily include
the principal sum due plus any interest up to the time judgment is
rendered. If at the 'time a receiver is appointed a claim has not been
reduced to judgment, the appointment of a receiver does not of itself stop the running of interest on that claim subsequent to the
appointment of receiver. Neither does the appointment of a receiver
of itself prevent a judgment being rendered against the defendant
whose property has been placed in the hands of a receiver.16 If
judgment is rendered ·against the defendant subsequent to the time
of appointment of receiver, this judgment, like any other judgment,
should be for the full amount of the claim plus interest up to the
time of rendering judgment. This judgment does not become a lien
on property in the hands of the receiver, neither can a levy or
" Cr.ARK ON ~CEMRS,

Vol. I, sec. ']67.

INTEREST IN RECEIVERSHIPS

45

execution be issued against such propeity.17 A judgment in such a
case is a liquidation of the claim and represents what the appointing court or another court has determined to be the amount of the
claim. A judgment against a defendant whose property is in the
hands o~ a receiver is a measure of the plaintiff's claim at the time
the judgment is rendered, and as far as ~e amount of the judgment
is concerned it makes no difference whether the defendant is solvent
or insolvent. .
When the owner of the judgment however, comes to present his
judgment to the appointing court and demands payment out of the
assets in the receiver's hands, then the appointing court before ordering distribution must determine whether or not the defendant is
solvent and whether or not all proper claims can be paid in full. If
insolvency· is found, then some or all claims must be scaled down.
If the court can distribute equitably by refusing to consider interest
after appointment of receiver, then a judgment rendered subsequent
to appointment must be adjusted to its value at time of appointment
of receiver. Payments are to be made on adjudicated claims; not on
the amount due. upon the claims when adjudicated.18 When the appointing court comes to allow this adjudicated claim it will therefore
determjne the value of this claim as of the time when insolvency
occurred or at the time when distnoution is made according to the
rule of interest which the distributing court adopts.
INTEREST WHEN SOI.VtNCY IS SHOWN

We have discussed at length the payment of interest in cases of
insolvency and shown that insolvency and appointment of receiver
does not take away the interest bearing quality of a debt, although
it may be stopped at time of appointment in certain case~ where the
stopping of it at this time will not militate against an equitable and
ratable distribution of the assets. If the appointment of a receiver
in some way did .stop the running of interest on claims, as some
courts hold, then it would be difficult in theory to restore this interest
bearing quality when solvency was determined. However, if the
debt has never lost its interest bearing quality, then the showing of
uCI.ARK ON
21

IO:o:IvERs, Vol. I, sec.

White v. Knox (1883),

III

766.

U.S. 784.
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solvency not only recognizes the interest bearing quality of the debt,
but in addition means that there are funds on hand sufficient to pay
interest up to the time of payment. Although there are many. contradictory decisions on tlie subject of interest when there is insolvency shown, nevertheless, the decisions are generally uniform in
holding that when solvency is shown, debts' shall draw interest as
if no receiver had been appointed.19
Cincinnati, Ohio.
RAr,PH E. Cr.ARK.
'"See Note

II,

supra.

